By Francis J. Carney, Jr., Ph.D.
Former Director of Research During the Boone and Hall Administratons
Executive Summary
In the 1970s, change was in the air in corrections. Landmark legislation had prescribed changes that would transform corrections from an institution-based system to a system with a strong community- based component – including, for the first time, pre-release centers, work and educational release, furloughs, and other initiatives that would ease the transition from prison to street. A goal of this paper is to review the research on these 1970s community-based programs and consider the implications for contemporary corrections.
The DOC compiled numerous statistical reports and conducted several studies on these 1970s initiatives, and the convergence of the data in all this research is that these community-based programs and facilities – particularly pre-release centers and furloughs – had a significant impact in reducing recidivism through a graduated release process. The evidence suggests that these community-based initiatives could play a similar role in further reducing recidivism today by enhancing the DOC’s expanding institution-based reentry regimen with a community-based arm so that the challenges of moving from life in prison to life on the street can be met in the community.
Today, there may be a special opportunity for re-establishing some of the initiatives of the 1970s. After decades of “tough on crime” policies and practices, the criminal justice policy pendulum seems to have begun a shift back toward a more progressive direction. The DOC population has been cut in half over the past decade; recidivism rates are declining; parole rates are increasing; Walpole is closed and Concord is closing. The timing seems right for the DOC to build on this momentum by extending its prisoner reentry initiatives from the institutions to the community through a renewed focus on pre-release facilities and programs, including work and educational release, furloughs, and other reintegration initiatives. The experiences of the 1970s correctional administrators and the research results supporting the effectiveness of the community-based initiatives of that period in reducing recidivism hold much promise for the revitalization of community corrections today.
Introduction. The 1970s stood out as a progressive period for correctional reform. There was a convergence of factors – social, political, legislative, legal – that set the stage for significant change in corrections. Emblematic of that change in Massachusetts was the passage of the Correctional Reform Act (Ch. 777 of the Acts of 1972). This landmark legislation provided the statutory framework for far-reaching change in corrections, allowing, for the first time, for the creation of a wide range of community-based facilities and programs. It created a new position of Deputy Commissioner for Community Services and called for the development of pre-release centers, work and educational release programs, furloughs, and other initiatives aimed at facilitating the reintegration of the offender back into the community. This legislation was significant not only for the transformational change that it promoted, but also for signifying the commitment of the Legislature and the Governor to that transformational change.
Implementing these changes would take bold and thoughtful leadership. The first Commissioner after the passage of Ch. 777 was John Boone, who was sworn into office in January, 1972, and who aggressively tackled the challenges of implementing a community-based component of the correctional system, creating pre-release centers and developing a robust furlough program. Boone’s tenure was marked by substantial progress on the community corrections front, but the credibility of his administration was strained by his aggressive granting of furloughs (including first degree lifers from Walpole) and especially by unrelenting turmoil at MCI-Walpole, which ultimately led to his resignation after 18 months in office. Boone was replaced by Frank Hall, who faced considerable challenges in restoring order at Walpole and maintaining the credibility of community corrections, while, at the same time, consolidating and expanding the gains made by Boone.
Others will describe the steps taken by Hall to meet the challenges he confronted when he became Commissioner of Corrections in 1973. The aim here is to review the research on the effectiveness of the pre-release programs – particularly their effectiveness in reducing recidivism.
Research on Pre-Release Centers. As early proponents of evidence-based practice, Boone and Hall both supported research on reintegration programs, and numerous statistical reports and evaluative studies were conducted during their administrations. For example, Table I (below) presents a comparison of recidivism rates from pre-release facilities vs. the recidivism rates of those released from higher security institutions during the Boone/Hall administrations. This table shows that inmates re-entering society through pre-release centers had a significantly lower recidivism rate than their counterparts returning to society from higher security institutions. Using a one-year follow-up period, the eight-year average recidivism rate for the pre-release group was 12%, compared to 24% for those released from higher security institutions. Also, the percentage of releases from pre-release facilities ramped up quickly from 1% in 1972 to 42% in 1977, as the DOC aggressively expanded its pre-release capacity in the Hall period.
TABLE 1:
A Comparison of Yearly Recidivism Rates for Releases from Pre-Release vs. Releases from Higher Security Institutions
Year | Number Released | % Released from Pre-Release | Pre-release Recidivism Rate | Higher Security Recidivism Rate | Total Recidivism Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1971 | 1107 | 0% | — | 25% | 25% |
1972* | 1550 | 1% | — | — | 22% |
1973 | 966 | 11% | 12% | 20% | 19% |
1974 | 911 | 25% | 12% | 21% | 19% |
1975 | 806 | 28% | 14% | 22% | 20% |
1976 | 925 | 40% | 9% | 21% | 16% |
1977 | 1138 | 42% | 8% | 19% | 15% |
1978 | 1118 | 36% | 9% | 21% | 16% |
1979 | 1053 | 35% | 16% | 32% | 26% |
1980 | 941 | 34% | 15% | 32% | 26% |
Average | 37%** | 12%*** | 24%*** | 20%*** |
*The pre-release center program began in November 1972
**Five-year average: 1976-1980
***Eight-year average: 1973-1980
Source: Daniel P. LeClair, Ph.D., “The Effect of Community Reintegration on Rates of Recidivism: A Statistical Overview of Data for the Years 1971 through 1985,” Massachusetts Department of Correction, (July, 1988).
This relationship between participation in pre-release and reduced recidivism was later corroborated by Daniel LeClair and Susan Guarino in a systematic review of 30 research reports over a 15-year period (1970-1985), including the follow-up of over 13,000 DOC releases for recidivism data. There was a convergence in the results of all these reports - participation in reintegration programs was found to be consistently associated with a significant reduction in recidivism.
The Base Expectancy Model. So, the long-term data clearly indicated that there was a significant relationship between participation in pre-release and reduced recidivism. What was not so clear was whether the reduced recidivism was a result of the impact of the pre-release programs or the types of inmates selected for pre-release in the first place. That is, if the DOC consistently selected low recidivism risks for placement in pre-release, then the recidivism rate would be low, irrespective of pre-release participation. There needed to be a way to control for selection factors related to transfer to pre-release.
The gold standard for such an approach would be the classic experimental design of randomly assigning subjects to treatment (pre-release) and control (non-pre-release) groups and then following up each group in the community to determine outcome (recidivism). As it turned out, the experimental design was not considered feasible for the early reintegration research. The timing was not right for setting up and implementing the randomization process. The results of the research would be a long time coming and there was concern for timely feedback. And there was also some concern about the “denial of service” issue whereby an inmate may have earned his way to pre-release and be considered a good candidate by classification staff, but be denied participation because by chance he landed in the control group.
So, an alternative to the experimental design was sought. DOC researchers struck on a quasi-experimental approach called the Base Expectancy Model. Base expectancy tables for predicting recidivism were developed based on follow-up of large numbers of DOC releases in order to identify those variables most closely associated with recidivism. The base expectancy tables could then be used to generate an expected recidivism rate for samples of releases. If there was an overrepresentation of low risks in the sample, the expected recidivism rate would be low; if, on the other hand, there was an overrepresentation of high risks, the expected recidivism rate would be high. Then, the expected rate could be compared to the actual recidivism rate for the sample. If the actual rate was significantly lower than the expected rate, there would be some assurance that the difference was more likely to be a result of the impact of the program, and not just to the types of inmates who were selected in the first place.
The first study of pre-release participation and recidivism, using the base expectancy model, was conducted by Daniel LeClair, former DOC Research Director and former Chair of the Boston University Department of Applied Sociology, in his doctoral dissertation in Sociology at Tulane University. LeClair followed up 137 inmates released from Boston State and Shirley Pre-Release Centers in 1972 and 1973 and determined that their actual recidivism rates were significantly lower than their expected rates generated from the base expectancy tables.
TABLE 2:
Expected vs. Actual Recidivism Rates of Releases from Pre-Release Centers in 1972 and 1973
Facility | No. of Releases | Expected Recidivism Rate | Actual Recidivism Rate | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Shirley | 62 | 31% | 18% | -13 pts |
Boston State | 75 | 22% | 8% | -14 pts |
Total | 137 | 26% | 12% | -14pts |
As Table 2 shows, the actual recidivism rate for these 137 releases (12%) was less than half the expected rate (26%), a difference that is highly significant (p <.001), indicating that the lower recidivism is more likely due to the impact of the pre-release program than to the selection process.
DOC researchers later corroborated these findings with a larger group of inmates released in 1974, including inmates released from maximum, medium, and minimum security, along with releases from pre-release.
TABLE 3:
Expected vs. Actual Recidivism Rates of Releases by Security Level in 1974
Facility | No. of Releases | Expected Recidivism Rate | Actual Recidivism Rate | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Maximum | 418 | 28% | 26% | - 2 pts |
Medium | 130 | 21% | 19% | - 2 pts |
Minimum | 81 | 22% | 9% | - 13 pts |
Pre- Release | 212 | 21% | 12% | - 9 pts |
Total | 841 | 25% | 20% | -5 pts |
Table 3 shows a substantial difference in expected vs. actual recidivism rates for those released from minimum security (22% vs 9%) and from pre-release (21% vs. 12%), while the corresponding rates for those released from maximum security (28% vs. 26%) and from medium security (21% vs. 19%) were quite similar. The data provide strong support for the reintegration model, as inmates released from lower security facilities recidivate at a much lower rate than expected (21% vs. 11% when minimum and pre-release are combined), while their counterparts released from walled institutions recidivate at almost the same rates as expected, indicating that the graduated release approach is effective in reducing recidivism – especially the movement from walled institutions to lower security facilities. Further, the data suggest that the overall reduction in recidivism (25% vs. 20%) can largely be attributed to the graduated reintegration back into society through lower security facilities.
Research on Furloughs. The furlough program was an integral component of the reintegration model under Boone and Hall. Early research indicated that furloughs were widely utilized and highly associated with reduced recidivism. For example, Table 4 presents a comparison of recidivism rates of those who received furloughs prior to release vs. the recidivism rates of those who did not receive furloughs during the Boone/Hall years. This table shows that inmates who had furloughs prior to release had significantly lower recidivism rates than their counterparts returning to society with no furlough experiences. The eight-year average recidivism rate for the furlough group was 12%, compared to 29% for those released without furloughs.
It is also noteworthy how aggressively the furlough program was implemented – especially in the Boone years. In 1973, the first full year of operation, 69% of inmates released to the community had at least one furlough, followed by a remarkable 74% in 1974. (That percentage did not hold in subsequent years, dropping to 42% in 1980 and 32% in 1985.)
TABLE 4:
A Comparison of Yearly Recidivism Rates for Releases with Furloughs vs. Releases without Furloughs Prior to Release
Year | Number Released | % with Furloughs | Recidivism Rate w/ Furloughs | Recidivism Rate w/o Furloughs | Total Recidivism Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1971 | 1107 | — | — | 25% | 25% |
1972* | 1550 | — | — | 22% | 22% |
1973 | 966 | 69% | 16% | 25% | 19% |
1974 | 911 | 74% | 14% | 31% | 19% |
1975 | 806 | 59% | 14% | 30% | 20% |
1976 | 925 | 51% | 9% | 25% | 16% |
1977 | 1138 | 50% | 7% | 23% | 15% |
1978 | 1118 | 49% | 8% | 24% | 16% |
1979 | 1053 | 44% | 14% | 36% | 26% |
1980 | 941 | 42% | 14% | 35% | 26% |
Average | 55%** | 12%** | 29%** | 20%** |
*The furlough program began in November, 1972.
**Eight-year average: 1973-1980
The Volume of Furloughs Granted/Escape Rates. As Table 4 suggests, furloughs were liberally granted in the early days of the program. In 1974, almost three-quarters of those released had been on at least one furlough. Table 5 presents additional data on the volume of furloughs granted, along with the escape rate by individuals and by furloughs for the Boone/ Hall period. This table shows that, from the inception of the furlough program in November, 1972, through 1980, 67,319 furloughs were granted to a total of 6,328 individuals, for an average of 10.6 furloughs per individual furloughed. So, the first takeaway from this table is that there was a remarkably high number of furloughs granted at the outset of the program.
The Volume of Furloughs Granted/Escape Rates. As Table 4 suggests, furloughs were liberally granted in the early days of the program. In 1974, almost three-quarters of those released had been on at least one furlough. Table 5 presents additional data on the volume of furloughs granted, along with the escape rate by individuals and by furloughs for the Boone/ Hall period. This table shows that, from the inception of the furlough program in November, 1972, through 1980, 67,319 furloughs were granted to a total of 6,328 individuals, for an average of 10.6 furloughs per individual furloughed. So, the first takeaway from this table is that there was a remarkably high number of furloughs granted at the outset of the program.
A couple of other noteworthy patterns emerge from this table. First, over the course of the 1970s, the number of individuals furloughed dropped substantially – from 1868 in 1973 to 1193 in 1980 – a reduction of 675 individuals furloughed, or, 36%. (The number of furloughs granted remained fairly stable, suggesting that a smaller number of inmates were receiving a larger number of furloughs.) At the same time, there was a significant drop in the furlough escape rate. (Consistent with DOC policy, an escape from furlough was defined as a failure to return to the facility within two hours of the prescribed return time.) When measured by furloughs granted, the reduction was from 1.9% in 1973 to 0.3% in 1980. When measured by escape rate by individuals furloughed, a similar pattern occurred – a drop from 7.6% in 1974 to 2.0% in 1980. In raw numbers the number of individuals who escaped on furlough plummeted from 134 in 1973 to 24 in 1980 – a dramatic drop of 82%.
TABLE 5:
The Yearly Number of Furloughs Granted and Escape Rates: Nov., 1972-1980
Year | Furloughs Granted | Individuals Furloughed | No. of escapes | Escape Rate by Individual | Escape Rate by Furlough |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1972* | 1182 | 793 | 8 | 1% | 0.7% |
1973 | 7195 | 1868 | 134 | 7.2% | 1.9% |
1974 | 8322 | 1668 | 127 | 7.6% | 1.5% |
1975 | 8680 | 1482 | 88 | 5.9% | 1% |
1976 | 7985 | 1305 | 40 | 3.1% | 0.5% |
1977 | 8199 | 1355 | 42 | 3.1% | 0.5% |
1978 | 9063 | 1248 | 38 | 3% | 0.4% |
1979 | 8040 | 1232 | 38 | 3.1% | 0.5% |
1980 | 8654 | 1193 | 24 | 2% | 0.3% |
Total** | 67,319 | 6,328 | 539 | 4%*** | 0.8% |
*The furlough program began in November, 1972.
**Eight-plus-year total/average: 1972-1980
***Adjusted to reflect the average yearly escape rate by individual.
It seems likely that the trend toward fewer individuals furloughed and the trend toward significantly lower escape rates were both related to a tightening of the furlough screening procedures by the Hall administration in order to maintain credibility of the program. The furlough program had the potential for becoming the “third rail” of community corrections and it was important to demonstrate that furloughs could be safely and productively integrated into the pre-release process. (In fact, that “third rail” potential became a reality in 1988 when Willie Horton escaped from furlough and committed serious crimes in the midst of Michael Dukakis’ 1988 presidential run. George H. W. Bush hammered away at the furlough escape, painting Dukakis as “soft on crime,” adversely affecting Dukakis’ bid for the presidency. This event resulted in a sharp reduction in furloughs and served as a reminder to future politicians of the perils of being perceived as “soft on crime.”)
There is one other metric that reflects the tightening of furlough screening process during the Hall administration – the percentage of inmates receiving furloughs by security level. Table 6 presents the number of individuals furloughed from each security level as a percentage of the average monthly population at each security level. For maximum and medium security institutions, the percentage of the population furloughed declined from 15% in 1974 to 2% in 1980. The corresponding figures for minimum security show a reduction from 55% to 44%, and for pre-release a reduction from 80% to 66%. For the total DOC population, the percentage dropped from 22% to 14%.
TABLE 6:
Percentage Average Monthly Population Furloughed by Security Level: 1974-1980
Year | Max/ Med Security | Minimum Secuirty | Pre- Release | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
1974 | 15% | 55% | 80% | 22% |
1975 | 14% | 60% | 75% | 21% |
1976 | 8% | 45% | 56% | 15% |
1977 | 6% | 60% | 55% | 16% |
1978 | 5% | 54% | 65% | 17% |
1979 | 4% | 47% | 60% | 16% |
1980 | 2% | 44% | 66% | 14% |
The reduction in furloughs was most noticeable in the maximum security institutions. Remembering that there were 8654 furloughs granted in 1980, it is noteworthy that, for Walpole, there were only 44 furloughs granted in 1980, down from a peak of 398 in 1976. Similarly, for Concord, there were only 14 furloughs granted in 1980, down from a peak of 1254 in 1973. These figures likely reflect the application of more stringent criteria for furlough selection implemented by the Hall administration, particularly for those in higher security settings.
Summary:
Research on reintegration programs in the 1970s reveals that community-based programs – particularly furloughs and pre-release centers, centerpieces of graduated release - were effective in reducing recidivism. In fact, the data indicate that those who experienced both furloughs and reentry through pre-release facilities benefited most in terms of recidivism reduction. Based on releases from 1973 to 1976, the expected recidivism rate for the 769 releases who both received furloughs and returned to the community through pre-release centers was 22%, compared to an actual recidivism rate of 9%. Conversely, the 967 releases who experienced neither furloughs nor reentry through pre-release centers had an expected recidivism rate of 26% and an actual recidivism rate of 29%.
LeClair and Guarino, who reviewed the results of some 30 DOC research reports over a 15-year period, reached an insightful conclusion:
Given that community-based prison programs are both theoretically sound and empirically justified, it would seem that their greatest obstacle is in maintaining credibility through effective administration.
In the early 1970s, John Boone implemented the community-based programs made possible by Ch. 777 at an accelerated pace. But, by the end of his tenure in mid-1973, the credibility of community corrections was strained by the aggressive granting of furloughs to a wide range of offenders (including lifers from Walpole) and especially by the perceived view of chaos at Walpole.
The challenge to incoming Commissioner Frank Hall was, in LeClair and Guarino’s words, to restore and maintain credibility in community corrections through “effective administration.” A focus of the Boston University Symposium on the Hall Era will be on the strategies and initiatives employed by Hall to promote “effective administration” as a foundation for consolidating and expanding the community-based programs initiated by Boone.
Implications for Contemporary Corrections
After reviewing the experience of the Boone/Hall period and following the arc of correctional history to the present, it seems clear that there is a cycle in criminal justice (and correctional) philosophy, policy, and practice. The late 1960s and early 1970s were peak liberal years; the late 70s and early 80s were transitional; by the late 80s and the 90s the pendulum had swung to the conservative side with a focus on incapacitation rather than reintegration, as illustrated by such “tough on crime” initiatives as three strikes laws, mandatory minimums, war on drugs, truth in sentencing, and curtailment of furloughs and parole; and the conservative bent persisted into the 00s. But, in recent years, there seems to be an emerging reversal of the conservative pendulum swing – a softening of some of the harsher “tough on crime” approaches.
One metric for measuring the orientation of criminal justice policies is the size of the prison population. The larger the prison population, the harsher the criminal justice policies. During the 1970s, the DOC population fluctuated between 2000 and 2900 inmates. From 1970 to 1972, the population was about 2400. During 1972, it dropped to 2000 and remained there until 1974. The population climbed to 2700 during 1975 and 1976. Between 1976 and 1980, the population gradually increased to 2900. After 1980, there was an upsurge in the DOC population, reaching 11,000 in the 1990s, and staying at that level until ultimately topping off at 11,819 during 2012. Since 2012 there has been a dramatic decrease in the DOC population from almost 12,000 in 2012 to under 6,000 in 2024 – essentially cutting the population in half. This dramatic drop in the prison population, which is likely driven by policy shifts, suggests a change in the correctional landscape, with the pendulum arcing back in the more progressive direction. There would seem to be fertile ground for substantive correctional reform – especially in the area of community-based corrections.
The significant drop in the DOC population has allowed the DOC to take the impressive steps of closing Walpole and scheduling the closure of Concord – two historic events in the annals of MA corrections. (Concord opened 1878 to replace the old Charlestown State Prison. But Charlestown, which itself opened in 1805, lasted another 78 years until Walpole opened in 1956 and finally replaced Charlestown. Such was the staying power of our venerable nineteenth century institutions.)
In addition to the big decline in the DOC population, there has been another significant trend over the past decade – i.e., a noticeable decline in recidivism. The DOC typically measures recidivism with one-year follow-up studies and three-year follow-up studies. The one-year follow-up research showed a reduction in recidivism from 23% in 2009 to 17% in 2016, while the three-year follow-up revealed a reduction from 43% in 2007 to 29% in 2018. DOC researchers have postulated that an emphasis on prisoner reentry may have contributed to this decrease in recidivism. Prisoner reentry has been a priority and the DOC has developed a range of reentry programs within the institutions.
Institution-based reentry programs are good. But the experience and the data from the 1970s indicate that the efficacy of the institution-based programs in reducing recidivism could be enhanced by a community-based component that could more seamlessly bridge the gap between life in prison and life on the street, helping an inmate to cope with the challenges of that transition in the community, rather than in prison.
One other metric that may be related to both the drop in the prison population and the reduction in recidivism is the paroling rate. The percentage of inmates released on parole doubled from 27% in 2018 to 56% in 2022. This trend may also be related to the perceived easing of “tough on crime” policies and practices of the past.
DOC Pre-Release Population Statistics. In recent years, the DOC has made limited use of pre-release centers. Table 7 presents a snapshot of the DOC criminal population on Jan. 1, 2015-2023, along with the number and percent in pre-release. This table shows that the percentage of inmates in pre-release has been quite low during this period and the percentage is trending downward, from 4.0% in 2015 to under 1.0% in 2022 and 2023. The actual number of inmates in pre-release has also dropped sharply, from 386 in 2015 to 41 in 2023 – a decrease of 89%.
TABLE 7:
DOC Criminal Population: Snapshot on Jan. 1, 2015-2023
Year | Population | Pre- Release | % in Pre- Release |
|---|---|---|---|
2015 | 9670 | 386 | 4% |
2016 | 9096 | 282 | 3.1% |
2017 | 8634 | 228 | 2.6% |
2018 | 8407 | 218 | 2.6% |
2019 | 8044 | 220 | 2.7% |
2020 | 7602 | 198 | 2.6% |
2021 | 6282 | 74 | 1.2% |
2022 | 5631 | 52 | 0.9% |
2023 | 5507 | 27 | 0.5% |
It is also noteworthy that most of the inmates in the three DOC pre-release facilities are classified as minimum security, limiting their full participation in reintegration programs. Table 8 shows that of the 314 inmates in the three pre-release centers on Jan. 1, 2023, 287 (91%) were classified as minimum security and 27 (9%) were classified as pre-release - 11 of 42 (26%) at Boston State; 10 of 186 (5%) at NECC; and 6 of 86 (7%) at Pondville.
TABLE 8:
Comparison of Inmates Classified as Minimum vs. Pre-Release at Three DOC Pre-Release Centers on Jan. 1, 2023, Including Data on Capacity
Classified as: | Boston State | NECC | Pondville | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Minimum | 31 (74%) | 176 (95%) | 80 (93%) | 287 (91%) |
Pre-Release | 11 (26%) | 10 (5%) | 6 (7%) | 27 (9%) |
Total | 42 (100%) | 186 (100%) | 86 (100%) | 314 (100%) |
Capacity | 200 | 277 | 204 | 681 |
% Beds Filled | 21% | 67% | 42% | 46% |
Regarding capacity, Table 8 shows that the three pre-release facilities had a total operating capacity of 681 beds and that on Jan. 1, 2023, 314 (46%) beds were filled. Overall, the data in Table 8 suggest that there is ample room to accommodate more pre-release inmates in these facilities - particularly at Boston State, which is operating at 21% of capacity - and possibly room to re-classify more inmates at NECC and Pondville from minimum to pre-release status, inasmuch as 95% and 93%, respectively, are currently classified as minimum security.
Expanding the pre-release population at Boston State and the re-classifying inmates already at NECC and Pondville from minimum to pre-release status could substantially increase the percentage of inmates returning to the community via reentry programs available to inmates in pre-release status.
DOC Release Statistics. The DOC release statistics are consistent with the population statistics. Very few inmates are returning to the community via pre-release centers and the trend is also downward. Table 9 shows the total number of releases from DOC facilities from 2015 to 2022. The percentage of inmates released from pre-release facilities is relatively low (the 2015-2022 average is 13%) and, like the population statistics, the trend is downward, from 17% in 2015 to 6% in 2022. In actual numbers, the reduction is from 430 in 2015 to 87 in 2022 – a drop of 80% over this period.
In the 1970s, up to 42% of inmates reentered the community via pre-release centers. (The average was 37%.) In 2022, only 6% were on pre-release status when they were released from the three DOC pre-release centers or other jurisdictions (22 from Boston State, 17 from NECC, 20 from Pondville, and 28 other DOC inmates who were released from pre-release facilities in federal, county, of interstate jurisdictions, bringing the total to 87).
By contrast, in 2022, there were 251 releases from maximum security – 92 from Walpole and 249 from Souza Baranowski. This represents 18% of the total releases for 2022, compared to the 6% returning to the community through pre-release centers. In raw numbers, there were almost three times as many inmates returning to the community directly from maximum security as there were returning via pre-release centers.
Table 9: DOC Criminal Population Releases: 2015-2022
Year | Total Releases | Released from Pre- Release | % Released from Pre- Release |
|---|---|---|---|
2015 | 2582 | 430 | 17% |
2016 | 2328 | 322 | 14% |
2017 | 2178 | 292 | 13% |
2018 | 2165 | 271 | 13% |
2019 | 2107 | 284 | 13% |
2020 | 1925 | 268 | 14% |
2021 | 1471 | 108 | 7% |
2022 | 1370 | 87 | 6% |
While the DOC has made limited use of its pre-release centers for prisoner reentry, it should be noted that there are other reentry resources in the community. For example, the Probation Department, through its Office of Community Corrections (OCC) , oversees a network of 18 Community Justice Support Centers across the Commonwealth. While these centers primarily serve as an alternative to incarceration, they also have a component for prisoner reentry. The DOC has apparently been making limited use of this resource in recent years. In its Annual Statistical Report on the Utilization of Community Justice Support Centers for FY 2023, OCC reported that, during the COVID-19 year, the DOC population in the Community Justice Support Centers reached a historic low and since 2020 the DOC population has continued to decline.
Nevertheless, these centers may be a particularly relevant resource for DOC releases since almost half of DOC releases (48%, or 663 of the 1,370 releases in 2022) return to the community under probation supervision (typically on a from and after probation). This may be an area where interagency cooperation could increase the participation of returning inmates in the Community Justice Support Centers services. (Interestingly, half of the 663 releases returning to the community under probation supervision are, at the same time, under parole supervision.)
Furloughs. The DOC has an excellent program for statistical reporting and evaluative research. Weekly population reports, user-friendly data dashboards, and comprehensive annual reports are available to the public. In the 1970s, annual reports on furloughs, including number furloughed, escape rates, impact on recidivism, were published. The last annual report with furlough data seems to have been in 1990. In recent years there is a conspicuous absence of any reference to furloughs in DOC statistical reports, suggesting that furloughs may be a rare occurrence in current-day corrections.
Research on furloughs during the 1970s revealed that it was a very active program with 67,319 furloughs granted to a total of 6,328 individuals from 1972-1980. The impact of furloughs on recidivism reduction was documented and escape rates declined over the course of the decade as guidelines for selection were strengthened. The evidence indicates that furloughs should be an integral part of any resurgence in community-based corrections initiatives.
Conclusion
The cycle of criminal justice has begun to reverse its movement in the conservative direction back to a more progressive direction. The “tough on crime” policies of the 1980s and 1990s, with their emphasis on incapacitation as an important goal, are giving way to policies with an emphasis on prisoner reentry as an important goal. The DOC has adopted prisoner reentry as a guiding principle for program development and has created a number of institution-based reentry programs.
We may be at a special moment in DOC history where the opportunity presents itself to significantly advance the concept of graduated release and prisoner reentry for DOC inmates by taking such steps as maximizing the utilization of existing post-release reentry services – especially the reentry services of OCC’s Community Justice Support Centers for those leaving the DOC under probation supervision. It would also be useful to review the laws governing transfer to pre-release centers to determine if there are statutory constraints that unnecessarily limit the transfer of otherwise appropriate candidates for pre-release. And a review of the DOC’s own classification guidelines and risk assessment tools may uncover possibilities for creating greater flexibility for re-classifying inmates who are already at pre-release centers in minimum security status to pre-release status. Furloughs should be considered as an integral component of any movement toward an expanded DOC pre-release capacity.
Research and experience from the 1970s indicate that community-based correctional programs are, in LeClair and Guarino’s words, “theoretically sound and empirically justified,” and that their greatest obstacle would be “maintaining credibility through effective administration.” The system-oriented management initiatives of the Hall administration provide some examples of effective administration helping to maintain credibility of such community-based programs. This may be the moment in the cycle of criminal justice to create significant structural change by expanding the community-based component of the correctional system. All signs point to that being an achievable and productive goal.
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